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other party the sum of three hundred dollars, which shall be paid in full,
on or before the forfeiture as above." R7eld, that on a failure by B. to
perform the contract, he was liable for the full sum of three hundred dol-
lars as liquidated damages: .- 'nde vs. Thompson.
Sale of Railroad Bonds-Erroneous Certificate of their being secured by
a first Mfortgage, how far Defence to Note for -Purchase-Aoney- Whether
Purchaser relied on Certificate, to be left to Jury.-If a railroad company
issues and sells bonds bearing upon their face a certificate, signed by per-
sons describing themselves as trustees, that the same are secured by a first
mortgage to them in trust for the bondholders, there is no absolute pre-
sumption that a purchaser thereof relies upon such certificate; and, in an
action upon a note given by him as a part of the consideration of the pur-
chase, the question should be submitted to the jury to determine whether
he accepted the bond, relying to any extent upon such certificate: _Edwards
vs. Jlarcl.
LEGAL INTELLIGENCE AND REFORM.
The late session of the British Parliament has been more than
commonly productive in law reforms. It is a fact not fully under-
stood by the profession in this country, in many instances, we be-
lieve, that legal reforms, taking their rise in Great Britain from the
example of this country, have far outstripped us in almost all use-
ful improvements in legislation in the last twenty years. In the
simplification of process and procedure, and in the accommodation
of remedies to afford the desired results, in all the courts of the na-
tion, high or low, the late English statutes, called the Common Law
Procedure Acts, are well worthy of imitation upon this side of the
Atlantic. In some respects, our codes of practice, and the consoli-
dation of the different forms of action, have been far more radical
than the English reforms; but they have been, as a general thing,
less adapted to produce the objects and purposes for which they
were designed. This has been owing, in some degree, no doubt, to
the undue admixture of unprofessional counsels in regard to these
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reforms, and the necessity of deferring to the ignorance and inex-
perience of the lay element in our legislatures, in order to secure
the adoption of any measure of reform after it was matured.
Whether that obstruction in the way of judicious law reform is in-
separable from our free and democratic institutions, it is not yet
time to decide with confidence. We see no reason to question why
the legislature of any of the American States may not ultimately
be made as willing to take the counsel of a standing legal com-
mittee of advice in regard to all changes in jurisprudence, or in
judicial administration, as the British Parliament. The experiment
has scarcely been, as yet, attempted in this country, and, until it is,
there is no fair ground to argue that it would not meet with accept-
ance. As a general thing, the pretensions and presumptuousness
of mere unprofessional men in the State legislatures, with rare ex-
ceptions, growing out of moral or mental obliquity, has been more
owing to the false glosses of manceuvring political sects and schools
probably, than to any innate perversity of temper or want of fair-
ness and teachableness of disposition in the members. Our legisla-
tures have only to know that the British Parliament, with ten or
twenty times the learning and experience of any of our State legis-
latures, never attempt to adopt any changes in the law until it has
been referred to a special commission, learned in that department,
and has then received the revision of a standing committee of the
judges and others learned in such matters: Our legislatures have
only to know this to induce them, we trust, to make their reforms
less radical, and, at the same time, more efficient.
But the subject which we now desire to bring to the notice of
the profession, is the late statutory provision of the British Par-
liament for the ascertainment of the law of foreign States. By the
22 and 23 Viet. c. 63, and the 24 Vict. c. 11, provision is made
both for the ascertainment of the laws of the different portions of
the British Empire and of foreign countries, whenever it shall come
in question in any of the courts of the realm.
This has hitherto been done by means of the testimony of those
skilled in the laws of the country whose jurisdiction affects the cause
of the action before the court. This was often a most perplexing
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matter, since the witnesses assumed the character of counsel far
more generally than would have been expected by those who had
not had experience upon the subject.
These statutes provide, in substance, that any of the superior
courts in her majesty's dominions may remit a cause pendingwherein
it shall become important to determine any question of foreign law,
to the courts of the State or country whose laws are brought in
question, with specific inquiries in regard to the law, desiring the
opinion of the court of last resort thereon. And this opinion, when
obtained, the domestic tribunal may apply to the determination
of the cause, the.same as if it had been pronounced by the court
where the cause is pending; or they may submit the cause to a
jury, with this opinion as conclusive evidence of the foreign law,
or as evidence of the law, in any other portion of the realm.
And if the court, upon the return of such opinion, are in doubt
in regard to the case having been properly understood, or being
fully stated, they may remit it to the same, or any other foreign
court in the State whose laws are in question, with or without
amendment, as often as may be necessary or expedient.
If some expedient of this, or a similar character, could be de-
vised for supplying to courts in all cases the information which
they now derive in a very imperfect manner, from the testimony
of experts, upon various subjects, it would be a most gratifying
advance in judicial reform.
The article in the London Jurist, June 29, 1861, will explain
the nature of these provisions more fully, and cannot fail to be
of interest to the profession here.
A valuable addition to the law of this country has just been
made by the legislature in the stat. 24 Vict. c. 11, intituled "an
act to afford facilities for the better ascertainment of the law of
foreign countries when pleaded in courts within her Majesty's
dominions." Before, however, proceeding to state its provisions,
it will be useful to advert to the previous state of the law, and the
evils which that statute, and the 22 & 23 Vict. c. 63, intituled
"c an act to afford facilities for the more certain ascertainment of
the law administered in one part of her Majesty's dominions when
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pleaded in the courts of another part thereof," of which it is a
great extension, "Were designed to remedy.
It has-ever been an established principle of law, that courts of
justice do not take judicial cognisance of the laws of foreign
countries-whenever the existence of such comes in question be-
ford a court, it must be proved as a fact. And this is not peculiar
to the Eriglish law, for it-may be looked on as a maxim of general
jurisprudence. (See Heinec. ad Pand., pars. 4, § 119; Id., pars.
1, § 103; Story's Confl. Laws, § 637, 5th ed.) But how is such
a fact to be proved?" The obvious and usual mode was by the
testimony of witnesses skilled in .the law of the country in ques-
tion. Whether a witness offered for this purpose stood in a posi-
tion to entitle him to give evidence on the subject as an expert
was of course a question to be decided by the court or judge, and
several reported cases show that this was occasionally a matter
of some nicety.
The inconvenience, and often the inefficiency of this kind of
evidence are well known to every practical lawyer. Partly owing
fo the uncertain character of the subjects to which they depose,
partly 'owing to the circumstance that it is almost impossible to
indict for perjury a man who only swears to his belief, testimony
of the loosest and most dangerous kind is daily given in courts of
justice by almost every'species of experts-medical men, survey-
ors, &c. , The testimony of' lawyers as experts is less frequently
required, but when it is, great conflict of opinion is often to be
found among the 'witnesses. On questions relating to the law of
France in particular, the- most discordant opinions of eminent
jurists and pratiti6nerg from that country are not unfrequently
adduced in our cort--a fact which inevitably leads to one of
these inferences-"either that a loose standard of morality exists
among the learned of that country, or, what we believe far more
likely, that 'the laW cf France is in a very unsettled state upon
many important matters-a conclusion much at variance with the
favorite, though most erroneous notion of many at the present
day,- that 'the Codes' Na6leon have succeeded in expelling all
doubts from French jurispiudence, and reduced the whole law of
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that country to a small volume, which every person, lawyer or
layman, can carry in his pocket, and interpret for himself. And,
whatever may be said of the evil resulting from courts of justice
being compelled to resort to the testimony of experts to prove the
laws of countries which are "foreign" in the proper sense of the
word, it almost amounts to absurdity in the case of countries which
are foreign in a technical sense only-i. e. those which, though
governed by different laws from England, are still under the
dominion of the British Crown, such as Scotland and the like."
To provide some remedy for these evils the two statutes to
which we have alluded were passed. The 1st section of the former
(the 22 & 23 Vict. c. 63) enables the courts in one part of her
Majesty's dominions to remit a case for the opinion in law of a
superior court in any other part thereof. By sect. 3, when a cer-
tified copy of the opinion is obtained, either party to the action
may move the court to apply that opinion, "and the said court
shall thereupon apply such opinion to such facts in the same
manner as if the same had been pronounced by such court itself
upon a case reserved for the opinion of the court, or upon special
verdict of a jury; or the said last-mentioned court shall, if it
think fit, when the said opinion has been obtained before trial,
order such opinion to be submitted to the jury with the other facts
of the case, as evidence, or conclusive evidence, as the court may
think fit, of the foreign law therein stated, and the said opinion
shall be so submitted to the jury."
This statute, it is obvious, went only a small part of the way
towards remedying the mischief. But it has been more effectually
attacked by the second-stat. 24 Vict. c. 11. The 1st section
enables any of the superior courts within her Majesty's dominions
to remit a case, with queries; to a court of any foreign state or
country with which her Majesty may have made a convention for
that purpose, for ascertainment of the law of such state. By sect.
2, when a certified copy of the opinion is obtained, either party
may move the court to apply that opinion; "and the said court
shall thereupon, if it shall see fit, apply such opinion to such
facts, in the same manner as if the same had been pronounced by
